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Abstract
We experimentally investigate corporate governance of a co-determined firm. The exper-
imental setup confronts the firm’s manager with three employees as stakeholders. There are
two investment opportunities, each of which could affect the stakeholders either positively or
negatively. First, the manager states his or her demand of the total value of each investment.
Then the three stakeholders, knowing the manager’s demands, state their claims via bidding.
The bidding rule is procedurally fair by treating all three stakeholders equally as long as stake-
holders truthfully state their own values, but offers underbidding incentives. We find that most
stakeholder-participants do underbid. The total bids are not significantly different from the
managers’ claims. Contrary to game theoretical prediction, manager-participants demand a
fair share of the value rather than almost the entire investment value. [126 words]
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1 Introduction
Studies of co-determination have been centered on the relation between the firm and its employ-
ees as stakeholders, treating the latter as a unity. Analyses of the effects of co-determination on
redistribution within the firm have placed strong emphasis on how the total revenue or value from
an investment is allocated between the management and the stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Addison
et al., 2001; Gorton and Schmid, 2000, 2004; Fauver and Fuerst, 2006; Hu¨bler and Jirjahn, 2003;
Jirjahn, 2017), but not on how much of the value is retained by individual stakeholders who are
involved in decision-making for the firm.
In many settings, the allocation problem is constrained by individual characteristics of the
stakeholders. Think, for example, of a project that generates different value to different employees
by adding to human capital in different ways.1 If the total value is positive, it is efficient to go ahead
with the project. Employees make bids in order to accept (or not) the project. Those who would
earn more from the project may hide this by underbidding strategically to increase their profits.
This, in turn, might discourage others to accept the project. The project will be under-invested, so
a quite profitable investment opportunity may fail.
An understudied problem in co-determination is how stakeholders share the burden of financing
investments. Back to the example above, the manager claims, on behalf of the shareholders or
owners, a share of the total value from the project. For the project to be acceptable, the employees
must be willing to collectively forego an amount of the total value that satisfies the claim by the
manager. In this respect, an employee’s bid for the project can be seen as expressing his or her
willingness to comply with the manager. In more general terms, this is similar to splitting the cost
of a public good with heterogeneous players (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989; Bagnoli and McKee, 1991;
Croson and Marks, 2001). In the specific context of co-determination, an investment is a public
good that generates value for all. By bidding less than his or her individual investment value,
a stakeholder makes a claim toward the total investment value. In this respect, the lower the bid
the higher the claim, under the assumption that the sum of individual bids is sufficient to cover the
manager’s claim.
A related issue in co-determination is how stakeholders cooperate in supporting an investment
that adversely impacts some of them (while being beneficial for the whole firm). For example,
a project that does not add to the skills of an employee might harm him or her. In this case,
1We are in the context of an employee’s decision to invest (or not) in human capital. In this situation, co-
determination is seen as solution to the so-called ’hold-up problem’ (see Becht et al., 2003; Chang, 1992; Grossman
and Hart, 1986), i.e. employees not investing in human capital for fear of losing the outcome of their investment
when the relation with the firm comes to an end. Even in a co-determined firm where employees have power to
influence corporate decisions, the management can try to exploit employees by high claims of the total value from an
investment (Dilger, 2003).
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others, who benefit from the project, might be willing to underbid less to both guarantee satisfying
the demand by the manager and compensate employees who would be worse off. In this respect,
bids may be seen as monetary valuations of employees for the project, which also capture their
willingness to lose when overbidding but also their claims of how much to gain from a project when
underbidding strategically. Therefore, ovderbidding can be seen as altruistic for the sake of an
investment that generates a positive value in total.
Gu¨th and Kliemt (2011) propose a procedurally fair mechanism that allows both positive and
negative evaluations, in which those who gain from a project can subsidise those who lose. The
mechanism is relatively simple and works as follows: each individual bids for a project for which s/he
has a certain individual value. Individual bids can be interpreted as objective and interpersonally
comparable measures of evaluating the project and how much bidders minimally want to gain from
it. For the project to be acceptable, all individuals together must bid no less than its cost. The
mechanism has the following characteristics:
• It is voluntary as no individual will ever pay more than s/he bids;
• It guarantees equal treatment with respect to bids as all individuals get the same net gain
from the project if everyone bids equal to his or her value.
• It is overbidding-proof as overbidding one’s value is weakly dominated;
Common truthful bidding would reveal the true surplus of the project’s total value minus its cost.
The surplus would be equally distributed among the bidders yielding equal net benefits for them.
Otherwise, bidders would only share equally the amount by which the total bid exceeds the cost of
the project. The mechanism is fair also because it grants veto power to those who are negatively
impacted by a project, who can block a project or obtain a compensation from the others by bidding
a sufficiently low amount.2 The cost of a project is exogenously given.
Here we propose a procedurally fair bidding mechanism for co-determination with similar fea-
tures.3 Unlike Gu¨th and Kliemt (2011), our co-determination mechanism gives the manager ultima-
tum power to influence acceptability by claiming a share of the the investment value as first-mover.
Specifically, our mechanism implements the following three-stages process for each investment op-
tion:
1. the manager decides how much to claim of the total value from the investment;
2. each stakeholder bids, being aware of the manager’s claim and of his or her own value from
the investment;
2In general, procedural fairness can be compared to a legal system where rules are common knowledge and accepted
as ‘fair’ by all parties involved (Carothers, 1998).
3See Gu¨th et al. (2011, 2014a); Cicognani et al. (2015); Gu¨th et al. (2014b) for related mechanisms.
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3. the manager decides whether (or not) to implement the investment, provided that the sum of
bids is no less than his or her claim, in which case the investment is acceptable.45
We aim to answer two main research questions. The first question is about the manager’s
demand:
Question 1: Will a manager claim almost the entire value from an investment?
In other words, will the manager exploit his or her first-mover advantage? An opportunistic manager
would essentially state a claim just below the total value, leaving the lowest positive amount to the
stakeholders, like the proposer in ultimatum bargaining. However, such profit-maximizing strategy
would pose a threat to acceptability of an investment for at least two reasons. Firstly, like in
ultimatum bargaining (see Camerer, 2003; Gu¨th and Kocher, 2014, for a review of experimental
results), a stakeholder may bid a sufficiently low amount in response to a high claim to reject the
investment. The procedurally fair bidding mechanism grants each stakeholder veto power. If a
stakeholder thinks the manager’s claim is unfairly large, s/he can punish the manager by blocking
the investment. Secondly, increasing the claim makes it harder for the stakeholders to bid enough
to finance the claim. This is an insight from experimental studies on threshold public goods games
where an increase in the cost relative to the value of a project would decrease the chance of its
successful provision (see Isaac et al., 1989; Croson and Marks, 2000; Rauchdobler et al., 2010).
We also explore the bidding decisions by the stakeholders:
Question 2: Will stakeholders ever bid truthfully, i.e. their individual value for the investment?
Or, will they behave opportunistically by bidding ‘just enough’ to render an investment accept-
able? The stakeholders face a trade-off in our setup. If they prioritize equality among them, the
stakeholders should bid truthfully as the procedurally fair bidding mechanism guarantees equal net
gains in case of common truthtelling. However, truthful bidding is not an equilibrium strategy
(e.g. Gu¨th, 2011). A profit-maximizing stakeholder will underbid until the surplus of the total bid
minus the manager’s claim becomes nil. Of course, this presupposes awareness of others’ bids or
knowledge of how others’ bids are determined by random values in the spirit of equilibria in games
with incomplete information.
We test the implentability of our mechanism in a laboratory experiment.6 In the experiment,
groups of four participants – one manager and three stakeholders – decide about the acceptance
of two investments (as alternative to the status quo of ‘no investment’). Decisions are made in
4In Gu¨th and Kliemt (2011), the mechanism selects the project that is most efficient, i.e. the project with the
largest surplus, thus this decision stage is unnecessary.
5Procedurally fair corporate governance does not require a manager. A joint venture firm, for example, could be
managed purely by its stakeholders via bidding. In our scenario this would simply mean that a manager’s claim is
zero.
6See Plott (1994) for ’testbed’ experiments of market institutions.
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successive rounds, varying investment evaluations and information conditions. More specifically,
we consider three types of investments, in which:
• all gain from all investment options;
• only one loses from all investment options;
• each can lose depending on the investment that is implemented.
This serious heterogeneity in evaluations allows us to assess how stakeholders cope with having
to meet the demands by the manager. In general, we expect less cooperation, and hence a lower
chance of acceptability, with more heterogeneity and more conflicting interests among stakeholders.
Although the procedurally fair mechanism ensures net equal pay via monetary compensations, this
holds only if all stakeholders bid truthfully. It is an empirical question whether a stakeholder’s
underbidding incentive increases when s/he loses from the investment.
The other treatment variable is information about stakeholder’s individual investment values,
which can be more or less commonly or only privately known. Specifically, we consider three
information conditions:
• public information condition: individual values are common knowledge between the manager
and all the stakeholders.
• semi-private information condition: individual values are private information of the respective
stakeholders. The manager only knows the total values, and
• private information condition: individual values are private information of the respective
stakeholders. The manager does not even know the total values.
In the semi-private and private information conditions, a stakeholder does not know the investment
values of the other stakeholders. Will the lack of knowledge about others’ values make it more
difficult for stakeholders to collectively accept an investment? In addition, expecting this difficulty
among stakeholders, will the manager claim less, even though s/he knows the total values in the
semi-private condition? In the private information condition, the manager does not even know the
total values. The latter is a particularly relevant scenario, given that in reality stakeholders may
not reveal their private values to the manager to raise their bargaining power. So the manager may
have to state a claim without knowing to what the investment yields.7
Our results show that, in response to Question 1, the manager claims significantly less than the
total value from an investment (only about 29.5% of the total value, on average), suggesting that
7There are few experimental studies of ultimatum games with asymmetric information in which the proposer is
not informed about the pie size. Gu¨th et al. (2017) report that the uninformed proposer tends to demand less, while
Klempt et al. (2019) find the effect is insignificant.
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most of the value from an investment goes to stakeholders.8 Concerning Question 2, stakeholders
are found to shade their bids, with the total bid being lower than the total value from an investment.
The total bid is not significantly different from the manager’s claim, with a project being acceptable
in 56.7% of all cases. Even though stakeholders do not truthfully bid, how does the procedurally
fair mechanism redistribute the investment value? It is estimated that (only for cases where the
manager’s claim is met), of every additional unit of individual value, the manager receives 0.253,
whereas the individual employee receives 0.465 when the individual value is positive. This is smaller
than 0.747, i.e. what the manager leaves, but larger than 0.235 (= 0.747/3), the marginal gain in
case of common truthful bidding. When the individual value is negative, the marginal gain for the
individual stakeholder is only 0.098 instead of 0.465. In other words, s/he would lose only 0.098
when his or her individual value goes down by 1 unit, as the loss in his or her own value is mostly
covered by other stakeholders.
Furthermore, we find the following treatment effects. In terms of varying investment evaluations,
a stakeholder with negative value tends to shade even more, that results in a lower probability of
satisfying the manager’s claim. With asymmetric information, the ratio of manager claim to total
value decreases by around 4.3 percentage points. Additionally, stakeholders bid higher to raise
their chances of meeting the claim. The lower claim and higher bids increase in the surplus , i.e.
total bid minus manager claim. Since the stakeholders receive (and equally share) this surplus,
there seems to be an incentive for stakeholders to hide their values.
The reminder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the procedurally fair bidding mech-
anism for co-determination and its properties: voluntariness, equal benefits to stakeholders, and
overbidding proofness. Section 3 is dedicated to the experimental implementation of the mecha-
nism. Section 4 presents the experimental results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Co-determination by a procedurally fair bidding rule
We consider a scenario where a manager and three (other) stakeholders choose between two in-
vestment alternatives, one safe and one risky, each of which could substitute the status quo of
no investment.9 The procedurally fair bidding mechanism asks the manager to state demands for
each investment; then the stakeholders submit monetary bids which essentially are also minimal
claims or aspirations when underbidding.10 The mechanism renders bids and payoffs objectively
8This is in line with the results from previous studies (see Gorton and Schmid, 2000, 2004; Fauver and Fuerst,
2006).
9Combining the two investments can be interpreted as a third alternative. Here we have considered the simplest
case of two alternatives to limit the cognitive burden for the sake of our participants.
10Similar to bids in post-price auctions which can be interpreted as aspirations for the case of winning the auction
(i.e. what one aspires to gain is the difference between one’s value and the bid.
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and inter-personally comparable by an internal reward unit to measure the payoffs of the various
firm members. Co-determination via bidding allows the three stakeholders to render an investment
acceptable or unacceptable. The manager can implement any acceptable investment but is not
obliged by acceptance.
In the following we denote by:
• M as the only manager-participant, and
• non-Ms, 1, 2 and 3, as the three (other) stakeholder-participants.
All four members collectively represent a commercial firm which can
• maintain its status quo with 0-payoffs for its M and non-Ms 1, 2 and 3, or engage in
• a safe investment S with stakeholder values vs1, vs2 and vs3, or alternatively
• a risky investment R whose stakeholder values are
– va1 , v
a
2 and v
a
3 in random event A and
– vb1, v
b
2 and v
b
3 in random event B
with v#i ∈ IR for # = s, a, b and i = 1, 2, 3. By v#i < 0, we allow that an overall efficient investment
S or R may harm one or more stakeholders. We may think of the two random events A as “boom”
and B as “doom” since vai -values are, on average, substantially larger than v
b
i -values. Although the
mechanism does not require this,11 we experimentally induce an objective and commonly known
probability of at most p = 1/3 for event A and at least 1− p = 2/3 for event B.
We test the implementability of our mechanism via a laboratory experiment which varies the
values of stakeholders 1, 2 and 3 and the information of the parties (within-subjects) from public
to private information. Specifically, we consider three information conditions: public (Pub), semi-
private (SemiPri), and private (Pri). These are summarized in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
In Pub, M and non-M participants know the monetary gains or losses from the safe investment
as well as from the two realizations of the risky investment, and their total values. In SemiPri ,
non-M participants are only informed of their own monetary values from the safe investment and
the two realizations of the risky investment, while participant M is only informed about the total
values for each investment and random state. Finally, Pri is like SemiPri for non-M participants,
11Game theoretically a mechanism defines only a game form and not an informationally closed game (the latter is
required by mechanism design based on the revelation principle).
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but M no longer knows the total values. We test whether non-M participants are better off by not
having revealed their private values to the manager and the other stakeholders.
For each given information condition, the decision process consists of three stages:
Stage 1: M states his or her demands for the safe investment S, denoted by ms ∈ IR, and for
each of possible events A and B in the risky investment R, denoted by ma and mb ∈ IR;
Stage 2: Knowing M’s demands ms,ma,mb, non-M participants state their bids βsi , β
a
i , β
b
i ∈ IR;
investments S and R are only acceptable when the sum of the corresponding bids guarantees M’s
claim respectively, e.g.
• safe investment S is acceptable if
∑3
i β
s
i ≥ ms and
• risky investment R is acceptable if both hold:
∑3
i β
a
i ≥ ma and
∑3
i β
b
i ≥ mb.
Stage 3: M can implement one accepted investment alternative or not; if not, the status quo is
maintained as in case of no acceptable investment.
The implications of these choices are:
• if no investment is acceptable or if M does not realize any acceptable investment, the status
quo is maintained which, without loss of generality, is assumed to yield 0-payoffs for all, M
and non-Ms participants;
• if safe investment S is acceptable and realized by M, then
– M earns his or her demand ms and
– non-M participant i = 1, 2, 3 earns
vsi − βsi +
∑3
j β
s
j −ms
3
;
• if risky investment R is accepted and realized by M, then payoffs depend on the random move
A or B:
– M earns his or her demand m# and
– non-M participant i = 1, 2, 3 earns
v#i − β#i +
∑3
j β
#
j −m#
3
,
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where # is a if the randomly selected event is A, otherwise b.
The minimal claim by non-M participant i = 1, 2, 3 as
c#i = v
#
i − β#i for # = s, a, b.
It is minimal since participant i gains at least c#i when the investment is realized.
The mechanism has three characteristics:
Characteristic 1: (Voluntariness): since investing requires acceptability one always has
∑3
i β
#
i −
m# ≥ 0 for # = s, a, b, that guarantees:
β#i −
∑3
j β
#
j −m#
3
≤ β#i
i.e. non-M participant i never pays more than his or her bid β#i for # = s, a, b and can actually
block an investment by bidding ‘low enough.’
Characteristic 2: (Equal net gains with respect to bids of common truthful bidding): if v#i = β
#
i
for # = s, a, b and i = 1, 2, 3, non-M participants would earn the same, namely
v#i − β#i +
∑3
j β
#
j −m#
3
=
∑3
j v
#
j −m#
3
when investment S or R is realized, respectively 0 when the status quo is maintained.
The procedurally fair mechanism disregards the values (normally private information) that em-
ployees attach to investments and treats employees equally according to their objective and inter-
personally comparable bids.
Characteristic 3: (Overbidding proofness): Any bidding strategy with bid β#i exceeding i’s value
for # = s, a or b is weakly dominated for i = 1, 2, 3 and # = s, a, b.
Overbidding proofness is only one requirement of incentive compatibility and does not exclude
strategic underbidding incentives. In fact, a stakeholder can even block an investment by bidding
low enough. By bidding sufficiently below the own value a stakeholder can either block an invest-
ment, or get a substantial compensation when the investment is implemented. Previous experiments
(see Gu¨th et al., 2011; Cicognani et al., 2015) report robust evidence of strategic underbidding.
Altogether the setup seems fair by allowing both M and non-Ms to state what they demand when
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an investment is implemented. Actually, M always s/he gets what s/he demanded via m# wheres
non-Ms only state their minimal demands c#i . In spite of overbidding proofness the mechanism does
not rule out overbidding which could be motivated by intrinsic (corporate identity) concerns letting
stakeholders abstain from blocking an investment that seems rather profitable for the firm.
3 The experiment
3.1 Parameters
All participants go through nine decision rounds. Each round consists of the three stages of the
decision process described in Section 2. At the beginning of the experiment, participants are ran-
domly divided into groups of four, then are randomly assigned the roles of either M or one of three
non-Ms. Group matching and roles are maintained throughout the experiment.
[Table 2 about here.]
The nine decision rounds are divided in three phases of three rounds each (see Table 2). Phases
1, 2 and 3 rely on information conditions Pub, SemiPri and Pri , respectively, as described in Section
2. The three phases are preceded by a practice phase of three rounds with information condition
Pub. 12 51 own individual value vsi , v
a
i and v
b
i , while M only knows the total sum of individual
values. Finally, in phase 3 (Pri), again, non-M participants are informed of their own individual
value, while M knows neither any value nor their sums (for the information conditions, see Table
1). We use the same investment values across phases. By the time the experiment reaches Phase
3, M has observed the total values for nine rounds (including the practice phase). This could allow
M to estimate the distribution of total values in Pri .
[Table 3 about here.]
The three rounds in each phase vary in the distribution of values of investments. Specifically,
in Round 1, all non-M participants gain from all of the investment options; in Round 2, only one
non-M loses from all investment realizations; and in Round 3, all non-Ms can lose depending on
the investment result (see Table 3). We are interested in the effects of conflicting interests among
non-Ms (Rounds 2 and 3) on non-M’s bidding and M’s claims.13
In each round, non-M participants are randomly assigned monetary values of Set 1, 2 and 3. To
avoid confronting participants with values already experienced previously, each value is perturbed
12The practice phase offers participants an opportunity to familiarize with the experiment. The practice phase is
identical to Phase 1, but the play is only hypothetical; participants are not monetary rewarded.
13Gu¨th et al. (2011) and Gu¨th et al. (2014a) find no significant effects of conflicting interests on contribution levels
in their threshold public projects experiments.
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by noise via randomly determined error term #i from the set {−40, −30, −20, −10, 0, 10, 20, 30,
40}.14
3.2 Procedures
Each participant was paid the sum of earnings made in three randomly selected rounds in addition
to a €5 show-up fee. Specifically, one round was randomly selected in each of three phases for
payment. The conversion rate was 100 experimental currency unit (ECU) per €. Negative earnings
were subtracted from the show-up fee. To exclude losses exceeding the show-up fee of €5 (= 500
ECU), a non-M participant, i = 1, 2, 3, was not allowed to overbid by more than 166 ECU:
β#i − v#i ≤ 166 for # = s, a, b.
Participants were students at [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process],
who were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was computerized using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Upon arrival, participants were randomly allocated to a cubicle and seated in
front of a computer. Participants were given written instructions (see the translated instructions in
Appendix A). Instructions were also read aloud to make them common knowledge. After reading
the instructions, some extra time enabled participants to read the instructions at their own pace.
After everyone finished reading the instructions, eight control questions (see Online Appendix B)
had to be answered before randomly assigning participants to groups (firms) of 4 and roles (either
M or non-M) for the whole duration of the experiment. The average duration of sessions was about
two hours. The average payment was €11.61 (including the €5 participation-fee).
We ran eight sessions in total. The number of participants were 32 in seven sessions and 28 in
one session, hence 252 in total.
The instructions abstained from alerting participants to the three characteristics of the proce-
durally fair bidding mechanism (voluntariness, equal treatment with respect to bids, overbidding
proofness) to avoid possible demand effects. Participants just learned about the co-determination
mechanism via reading the instructions, answering the control questions related to it, and expe-
riencing three practice rounds before confronting the incentivized decision tasks. In four sessions,
we added a paragraph in the instructions (see the paragraph in section What are the payoffs? of
Online Appendix A), specifically assuming negative monetary values (which might cause some ad-
ditional cognitive challenge for the participants) and illustrated the possible loss when overbidding
a negative value and how one can avoid this by not overbidding. We refer to these sessions as
‘nudging sessions’, since the amended instructions discourage overbidding in case of lowest and
14Although participants know that the investment values are randomly assigned, they are unaware of the rule of
random assignment, i.e. they are neither aware of the three sets of values, nor the distribution of error terms #i .
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negative values.15 However, we do not confirm significant effects of this additional paragraph in the
instructions (Section C.2 of the Online Appendix reports the regression analysis).
3.3 Theoretical analysis
Let us begin by assuming all participants to be opportunistic in the sense of own (expected) payoff
maximization, and to commonly know this in the epistemic game theoretic sense, meaning that
general opportunism applies, that this is known to all players, that all players know that they all
know this, ad infinitum.
This implies for all information conditions, Pub, SemiPri and Pri :
Conjecture 1: Non-M participant i = 1, 2, 3 will underbid his or her value by at least 1, the
smallest monetary unit:
β#i < v
#
i ⇔ c#i > 0.
This follows from all bidding strategies specifying a bid equal or above a stakeholder’s value are
weakly dominated by the strategy letting the stakeholder underbid this value by 1 unit. Conjecture
1 only requires stakeholder opportunism, not that it is commonly known.
In case of Pub or SemiPri with commonly known opportunism the set up provides sufficient
information, letting M exploit his or her first-mover advantage by claiming the total of the non-Ms’
values minus 3. Stakeholders should expect this and claim c#i of 1, like in ultimatum games. As
in ultimatum games, there can be other equilibria which involve weakly dominated strategies.
Conjecture 2: M will claim the total value of non-Ms minus 3, expecting that all non-Ms bid
their values minus 1, when the total value exceeds 3 units:
m# =
3∑
i
v#i − 3, (1)
and
β#i = v
#
i − 1 ⇔ c#i = 1
if
3∑
i
v#i > 3.
For Pri only Conjecture 1 applies since M is unaware of non-Ms’ total value. Behaviorally, one
could expect that M in Pri may infer from previous tasks the range of non-Ms’ total value (see Table
3) and cautiously demand less than the expected total value. This, in turn, should induce non-Ms
15This was intended to rule out the possibility that such case-dependent, crowding-in effect of underbidding a
negative value is due to cognitive problems (i.e. mis-reacting to negative values).
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to underbid their values by at least 1 unit without, however, engaging in excessive underbidding
that would risk to end up with the status quo and 0-payoffs.
3.4 Research questions
In this study, we are interested in answering two main research questions:
Question 1: Will a manager claim almost the entire value from an investment?
The aim of Question 1 is to examine Conjecture 2. Specifically we ask if M claims equal to m#i as
in Eq. (1). Behaviorally, M might lower his or her claim because this would increase the chance of
acceptance.
Question 2: Will stakeholders ever bid truthfully, i.e. their individual value for the investment?
Characteristic 2 of the procedurally fair mechanism implies equal net gains with respect to bids in
case of truthful bidding:
β#i = v
#
i ⇔ c#i = 0. (2)
Alternatively, non-M participants might underbid strategically (see Conjecture 1) up to the point
where the total bid meets M’s claim:
3∑
i
β#i = m
# if m# ≤
3∑
i
v#i − 3. (3)
If non-Ms try to achieve an equilibrium that satisfies Eq. (3) rather than bidding truthfully (Eq.
2), they face a difficult coordination problem due to the many different ways in which non-Ms can
account for the claim by M. This problem is likely exacerbated by differences in monetary values
which increase over Rounds (see Table 3). Because of this, we may expect non-Ms to ‘struggle’ more
in Rounds 2 and 3 than in Round 1.16 However, in Phase 1 (Pub), where M knows each non-M’s
value, M might be willing to claim less in Rounds 2 and 3 if s/he believes that non-Ms find it more
difficult to bid high enough to accept M’s claim. For this reason, we are unable to predict the effects
of heterogeneous investment values on the probability of acceptance of an investment.
In Phase 2 (SemiPri), M may claim less than in Phase 1. This is because, without knowing
the investment value of each non-M, M cannot exclude the possibility of heterogeneous investment
evaluations. In Phase 3 (Pri), where M does not even know the total value of investments, M may
claim even less. If M is risk averse, his or her claim might decrease in Pri compared to Pub and
SemiPri . However, this effect might be mitigated by experience of nine rounds of play (including
the practice phase) before M encounters Phase 3 (Pri).
16In threshold public goods games, different valuations across group members reduce the likelihood that total
contributions reach the threshold (see Marks et al., 1999).
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4 Results
4.1 Main findings
To address Question 1, we compare M’s claim ratio, i.e. M’s claim divided by the total value,
m#
/∑3
i v
#
i , to 1 − 3
/∑3
i v
#
i as predicted (see Conjecture 2). Figure 1 plots the claim ratio
against the total value of safe and risky investments (for its two random realizations A and B) for
non-M participants in each round of the three information conditions (i.e. Pub, SemiPri , and Pri).
In all information conditions, almost all data points lie well under the line of Eq. (1), showing that
M claims were systematically lower than the total value of non-Ms minus 3. The average claim ratio
is 29.5%. A one-sample t-test rejects Eq. (1): M claims are significantly lower than predicted (see
the first column of Table 4).
Result 1: Managers claim significantly less than the total investment values.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
Now let us turn to Question 2. Do non-M participants bid truthfully? Figure 2 is a scatter
plot diagram of non-M bids against their values. Most bids are below the 45-degree line of truthful
bidding (see Eq. 2). Underbidding is confirmed by a bootstrap test (see the second column of Table
4).17
Result 2: Stakeholders bid significantly less than their values.
[Figure 2 about here.]
If non-M participants are underbidding their values, are they profit maximizing and relying on
one (of many) Nash equilibrium that satisfies Eq. (3)? In Figure 3, the vertical axis is the ratio of
the surplus of non-M total bids minus M claims and non-M total value:
(∑3
i β
#
i −m#
) /∑3
i v
#
i .
On average, the surplus appears to be quite close to the equilibrium level of zero. This is confirmed
by a bootstrap test (see the third column of Table 4). We cannot reject the null hypothesis of Eq.
(3). While the average surplus does not differ from zero, we observe substantial heterogeneity of
the surplus around the zero benchmark in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here.]
17The evidence of strategic underbidding is consistent with previous experiments on procedurally fair bidding in
threshold public projects game (Gu¨th et al., 2011; Cicognani et al., 2015).
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The rejection rate of M claims is 43.3%,18 while the prediction is 100% acceptance at least in
Pub and SemiPri (see Conjecture 2), since total values always exceed 3 units. Probit analysis shows
that acceptance probability is lower when M claims more (see Table 5). We propose two possible
explanations of this correlation:
1. Our experiment features an ultimatum game with the M participant as a proposer and non-
Ms as responders. Typically, responders tend to punish their proposer in case of an unfair
offer (see Camerer, 2003; Gu¨th and Kocher, 2014).
2. Alternatively, non-M bidding at Stage 2 can be compared with contributing to a threshold
public good. As Croson and Marks (2000) report, contributions tend to fail to coordinate at
an equilibrium of the provision point mechanism when the threshold is large.19
We reckon that the second motive is significant. Figure 4 shows the histograms of the ratio of M
claim to non-M total value in two cases: (1) M’s claim is accepted and (2) M’s claim is not accepted.
Even if M claims less than a quarter of total value, which implies an equal split among M and three
non-Ms, there are many rejections. Regression (1) predicts the acceptance probability is only 61.1%
when M’s claim ratio is 25%. In the ultimatum game literature, we are not aware of such a low
acceptance probability when the proposer offers an equal split of the pie.
[Figure 4 about here.]
In fact, our statistical analysis indicates that non-M decisions are affected by the outcome of
previous play. If non-Ms rejected M’s claim in the previous round, they tend to raise their bid in
the current round and vice versa, even when M has not changed his or her claim (for a detailed
analysis, see Section C.1 of Online Appendix). If non-Ms are only concerned with equality, they
should not change their bids as long as M claims the same. This evidence is further support for the
second motive: After failing to coordinate at the equilibrium (Eq. 3), non-Ms increase their bids to
more likely accept M’s claim in the following round.
[Table 5 about here.]
We also find M claims to be positively correlated with the surplus in the previous round. Thus,
generating a positive surplus by bidding truthfully seems to invite M participants to claim more in
the following round. In other words, 100% acceptance of to M claims (≤ ∑3i v#i − 3) by truthful
18737 claims out of all 1701 claims by Ms are not accepted.
19Croson and Marks (2000) define the Step Return (SR) as aggregate group payoff from the public good divided
by a total contribution threshold. In Stage 2 of our setup, SR =
∑3
i
v#i
/
m# , thus a higher claim means lower SR.
Croson and Marks find that reducing SR renders successful provision less likely, even in case of full refunding if the
provision point is not met, like our setup.
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bidding would let the play converge to the prediction of Conjecture 2, that non-Ms should and will
try to avoid.
Facing a real threat of rejection by non-Ms, how do M participants decide their claims? To
examine whether M claims are profit maximizing, we draw Figure 5 by using Regression (1). The
horizontal axis is the ratio of M claim to total value. The downward-sloping curve is the estimated
acceptance probability. The flat slope implies that even low claims are likely rejected. The inverse
U-shape function is the probability multiplied by the claim ratio, i.e. the expected payoff divided
by total value. The apparent peak of the expected payoff is where M claims something between
40-50% of the total value. However, not only the median but also the interquartile range of the
actual claim ratio are smaller than that.20
[Figure 5 about here.]
Although non-M participants do not earn equal net gains, as it would be when commonly bidding
truthfully (see Characteristic 2 of our procedurally fair bidding rules), is there any redistribution
among them? Figure 6 shows the possible payoffs of non-Ms against the non-M’s value when M’s
claim is accepted. These are all the possible payoffs before M chooses to realize an acceptable
investment at Stage 3 which then determines the actual payoffs. On average, M participants claim
29.5% of the total value (see Figure 1), and the ratio goes down to 25.3% if we consider only accepted
claims. Hence:
• If there is no redistribution, each non-M participant bids 0.253 to meet M’s claim and earns
0.747 for each value unit she receives from the investment.
• If non-Ms bid truthfully, 74.7% of their total value generates the surplus, which is equally
divided between the three non-M participants. So, each non-M participants earns 0.747/3 =
0.235 per unit of investment value.
The slope in Figure 6 is approximately a half. It is even flatter when the value is negative. More
precisely, the corresponding linear regression (see Table 6) estimates that the slope coefficient is
0.465 if the value is positive, otherwise 0.465− 0.367 = 0.098. Hence, non-Ms are redistributing to
a certain extent.
[Figure 6 about here.]
[Table 6 about here.]
20Our finding of the low claim by M participants can be compared with the findings of generous offers by the proposer
in the ultimatum experiment of Henrich et al. (2001). The reason for making generous offers in the ultimatum game
might be a proposer’s pessimistic belief that the responder will accept his or her offer (see Costa-Gomes and Zauner,
2001).
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Let us summarize our answers to Questions 1 and 2. M-participants are no profit maximizers
as described by Conjecture 2. Instead of the equilibrium strategy as in Eq. (1), Ms claim only
29.5% of the total value. Non-M participants do not bid truthfully. They rather engage in bid
shading as described by Conjecture 1. We do not find evidence that non-Ms’ total bids differ from
the equilibrium level but confirm substantial heterogeneity in group outcomes.
4.2 Additional findings
In this section, we analyze how effects on M claims and non-M bidding behavior depend on infor-
mation condition and investment type.
Table 7 reports the results of linear regressions on M’s claim ratio m#
/∑3
i v
#
i , which corre-
sponds to Figure 1. The findings of Regression (5) are as follows:
• The larger the total value of an investment the smaller M’s claim ratio. This is statistically
significant, though the effect is practically small, e.g. the increase in the total value by 1000
ECU reduces the ratio by approximately 1.35 percentage points for Pub and SemiPri . This
differs from the findings of previous ultimatum bargaining experiments that proposers offer
smaller shares when the pie size increases (see, e.g., Andersen et al., 2011). A possible reason
is that non-Ms have to coordinate how to reach the threshold given by M’s claim, a problem
which responders in two-player ultimatum games does not encounter. M participants may
predict instead that the chance of acceptance depends on the ratio of the threshold to the
pie.21 When the investment value is large, a risk-averse M may choose to claim less to increase
the probability of acceptance.
• The total value of an investment has similar effects in Pri, even though M does not exactly
know the total value in this information condition. In our view, after experiencing the practice
phase, Phases 1 and 2, M can well estimate the total values of investments S and R.
• When M-participants know the investment values of each non-M participant (Phase 1), the
claim ratio is significantly smaller in Round 2 and Round 3, although this effect (see Regression
5) is only mildly significant for Round 2. This can be explained by M-participants assuming
that non-Ms cooperation in guaranteeing M’s known claims will be more difficult if investment
values are heterogeneous. In Round 3, where every non-M can lose from an investment,
cooperation is expected to be even more difficult compared to Round 2 with only one non-M
losing and having to be compensated by the others.
21In threshold public goods games, the step return (see Footnote 19) is found to be a strong predictor of successful
provision (see Croson and Marks, 2000; Cadsby et al., 2008).
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• M reduces his or her claim ratio by 0.0390 in Phase 2 (SemiPri) compared to the one in Round
1 of Phase 1 (Pub). M is informed about the total values but not of non-M’s individual values.
So M does not know if non-Ms lose from an investment or not. In our view, M claims less to
let non-Ms accept more easily .
• The reduction in M’s claim ratio is larger in Phase 3 (Pri): 0.0429. In addition, the negative
slope coefficient with respect to total value is steeper: -3.08e-05. M tends to be cautious when
unaware of the total values. Our finding is consistent with Gu¨th et al. (2017), whose ultimatum
proposer, when uninformed about the pie size, reduces his or her claim. We conclude that
non-Ms should not reveal their investment values to M participants in order when wanting to
enhance their profits.
We also check the influence of different investment types, S and R. Regression (6) has variables
for the realizations A and B of the risky investment instead of total value.22 Since total value
and realizations A, B are highly correlated (see Table 3), it is difficult to conclude which variable
explains better. In our view, Regression (5) is performing better than (6). Firstly, (5) has higher
likelihood. Secondly, if M participants prefer the risky investment to the safe one, we would expect
the coefficients for both risky events A and B in Regression (6) to be significantly negative. However,
there is also an argument supporting Regression (6). Table 8 reports the regression analysis on non-
M’s bids. Non-M participants tend to bid less for risky investment’s realization A. So, it might be
that M participants claim less to adjust to non-Ms lower bids.
[Table 7 about here.]
Both regressions in Table 8 rely on the same models. Regression (7) uses all observed non-M
bids. Since the estimated coefficients are highly influenced by five extremely low bids, between
−4000 and −9999 just to block an investment, Regression (8) excludes these low bids. We find from
the latter regression that:
• If M increases his or her claim by 1 unit, the three non-Ms increase their total bid only by
0.110× 3 = 0.330. Hence, a higher claim ends up with lower probability of acceptance. This
is confirmed by probit regressions on the acceptability of M’s claim (see the first row of Table
5).
• The slope coefficient of value v#i is 0.412 if v
#
i ≥ 0, otherwise 0.412 + 0.703 = 1.115. In
addition, a bid decreases by 46.12 if the value is negative. This shows strong ’loss aversion’ of
non-Ms, in the sense of perceiving negative values per se as losses.
22The regression model with both total value and risky events A and B suffers from multi-collinearity.
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• Non-M participants bid more in SemiPri and Pri , probably due to non-M participants being
not sure whether other non-Ms may have negative investment values when values are private
information. Collectively accepting M’s claim can be more difficult as non-Ms with negative
value significantly underbid, hence non-Ms are willing to bid more.
• The preference for the risky investment is inconclusive. While bidding less for event A than
for the safe investment, bidding for event B does not differ significantly. It seems that non-M
participants are not very optimistic when betting on event A.
[Table 8 about here.]
Finally, let us look at the effects of heterogeneous investment values and information conditions
on the acceptance probability of M’s claim. We regress the acceptance by a probit model (see Table
5). The implications of Regression (2) are as follows:
• The acceptance probability is lower in Rounds 2 and 3, irrespective of whether the information
condition is Pub. In Phase 1 (Pub), M claims less in these rounds (see Table 7), but M does
not lower his or her claims enough to keep the acceptance probability unchanged when a
non-M with negative value bids dramatically less (see Table 8).
• As mentioned above, M claims less in Phase 2 and even less in Phase 3 (see Table 7). Non-
Ms bid higher in Phases 2 and 3 (see Table 8). As a result, the acceptance probability is
significantly higher, especially in Pri . This information condition favors non-Ms because the
increase in the surplus (i.e. the total bid minus M’s claim) is shared equally between non-Ms.
Linear regression estimates suggest that non-M payoffs increases by 19.70 in Pri (see Table
6).
We do not find any significant effects of the riskiness of an investment (see Regression 3).
5 Final remarks
Collective decisions in firms can be perceived as ‘fair’ when they directly involve employees as
stakeholders who can even block an investment by bidding sufficiently low. We have proposed
a procedurally fair bidding mechanism of co-determination with rules determining how the total
value from an investment is shared among the manager and three stakeholders. We have tested the
implementability of our mechanism by a laboratory experiment where we manipulate investment
values and information about these values.
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Our results confirm dominance of strategic underbidding by stakeholders and provide evidence
that managers do not claim the whole investment value. Stakeholders’ total bid is often not
larger than what the manager claims. Collectively, the modal behavior of all stakeholders is to
just guarantee the managers’ claims. We interpret this as ‘opportunistic’ behavior of stakeholders
who, rather than rendering a manager’s claim acceptable, bid ‘lowest subject to likely acceptability’.
Managers claim significantly less than the total investment value. This could be due to genuine
altruism or willingness to enhance the acceptability of an investment (to disentangle these motives
is beyond the purpose of this study). An alternative explanation is that stakeholders are trying to
limit or even prevent exploitation by the manager. As a result, managers’ average accepted claim is
only 25.3% of the average total value, that implies equal shares for all four participants on average.
Overall, the mechanism allows both positive and negative evaluations and is robust to limiting
information. In fact, it seems to perform even better in terms of ‘acceptability’ under private infor-
mation conditions, i.e. when the manager does not know the total value from an investment. In this
case, a manager reduces his or her claims and stakeholders bid higher, that increases acceptability
and the surplus of an investment. Such behaviour of managers and stakeholders here could be due
risk aversion since uncertainty regarding the values of others would render everyone more cautious.
Due to the relative large share of value retained by stakeholders, our mechanism seems to favour
increasing labour productivity rather than facilitating investments in capital. This is not far from
the reality of large co-determined firms. FitzRoy and Kraft (2005) found that co-determination in
Germany has increased labour productivity, which is linked to accumulation of human capital and
increasing job satisfaction.
While we have applied procedural fairness to codetermination, the mechanism is also applicable
to other types of corporate governance such as large industrial groups like Volkswagen, where the
top management of the company negotiates with the heads of its subunits (e.g. Audi, Skoda, . . . )
whether (or not) to restructure the whole firm (e.g. by substituting fuel engines by environmentally
cleaner ones).
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Table 1: Information conditions in the experiment
Information condition M’s information Non-M i’s information
Pub v#i for all #, i v
#
j for all #, j
SemiPri
∑3
i v
#
i for all # v
#
i for all #
Pri No information v#i for all #
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Table 2: The order of nine decision tasks (and the practice tasks)
Phase Practice 1 2 3
Information Pub Pub SemiPri Pri
Task (Round) 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
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Table 3: Investment value v#i in three successive tasks of all phases
Task (Round) Set Safe Investment Risky Investment
A B
1 1 500 + s1 1000 + 
a
1 250 + 
b
1
2 500 + s2 1000 + 
a
2 250 + 
b
2
3 500 + s3 1000 + 
a
3 250 + 
b
3
Total 1500 +
∑3
i 
s
i 3000 +
∑3
i 
a
i 750 +
∑3
i 
b
i
2 1 1200 + s1 2400 + 
a
1 600 + 
b
1
2 500 + s2 1000 + 
a
2 250 + 
b
2
3 −200 + s3 −400 + a3 −100 + b3
Total 1500 +
∑3
i 
s
i 3000 +
∑3
i 
a
i 750 +
∑3
i 
b
i
3 1 1200 + s1 1000 + 
a
1 −100 + b1
2 500 + s2 −400 + a2 600 + b2
3 −200 + s3 2400 + a3 250 + b3
Total 1500 +
∑3
i 
s
i 3000 +
∑3
i 
a
i 750 +
∑3
i 
b
i
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Table 4: The block bootstrap of one-sample t-test on Eqs. (1), (2) and (3)
Null-hypothesis Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3)
t-value -49.51*** -55.47*** 2.509
(2.846) (6.534) (2.533)
Observations 1,134 6,804 1,679
Notes: Bootstrap standard error in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Replications are 9999
(for the number of bootstrap samples, see MacKinnon, 2002). Block bootstrap is clustered at group level.
The test on Eq. (1) excludes Phase 3 (Pri) data, in which M participant does not know the total values of
investments. The test on Eq. (3) uses the observations that satisfy m# ≤∑3
i
v#i − 3.
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Table 5: Probit models of the accpetability of M’s claim
Regressions (1) (2) (3)
Variables Accept Accept Accept
M’s claim ratio m#
/∑3
i v
#
i -2.478*** -2.469*** -2.538***
(0.268) (0.273) (0.278)
Total value
∑3
i v
#
i 0.000231*** 0.00104
(3.62e-05) (0.000774)
Phase 2 (SemiPri) 0.194 0.189
(0.135) (0.135)
Phase 3 (Pri) 0.377*** 0.372***
(0.137) (0.138)
Risky investment A -1.381
(1.163)
Risky investment B 0.396
(0.585)
Phase 1 (Pub) × Round 2 -0.798*** -0.807***
(0.141) (0.142)
Phase 1 (Pub) × Round 3 -0.584*** -0.594***
(0.140) (0.141)
Phase 2 (SemiPri) or 3 (Pri) × Round 2 -1.023*** -1.033***
(0.105) (0.106)
Phase 2 (SemiPri) or 3 (Pri) × Round 3 -0.832*** -0.837***
(0.105) (0.105)
Constant 0.902*** 0.907*** -0.144
(0.0963) (0.162) (1.168)
Observations 1,701 1,701 1,701
Number of groups 63 63 63
Notes: The dependent variable Accept is 1 if non-Ms total bid is equal to or larger than M’s claim:∑3
i
β#i ≥ m#i , otherwise 0. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Random
effect models clustered at group level.
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Table 6: Linear regression of non-M’s possible payoff when M’s claim is accepted
Regression (4)
Variables Payoff
Investment value v#i 0.465***
(0.0285)
Investment value v#i × (Dummy for v
#
i < 0) -0.367***
(0.0936)
Phase 2 (SemiPri) 6.279
(7.254)
Phase 3 (Pri) 19.70***
(7.497)
Risky investment A 157.7***
(16.34)
Risky investment B -47.42***
(8.947)
Round 2 -32.38***
(8.542)
Round 3 -24.79***
(8.569)
Constant 121.9***
(14.59)
Observations 2,892
Number of groups 63
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Clustered at the
group level and the subject level. Robust errors are used due to heteroskedasticity. We are reporting all the
possible payoffs at Stage 2 of the game. These are not actual payoffs that are determined after M decides
whether to implement one accepted investment alternative or not at Stage 3.
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Table 7: Linear regressions of the ratio of M’s claim to the total value m#
/∑3
i v
#
i
Regressions (5) (6)
Variables Claim ratio Claim ratio
Total value
∑3
i v
#
i × (Pub or SemiPri) -1.35e-05***
(4.65e-06)
Total value
∑3
i v
#
i × Pri -3.08e-05***
(6.58e-06)
Phase 1 (Pub) × Round 2 -0.0293* -0.0294*
(0.0151) (0.0151)
Phase 1 (Pub) × Round 3 -0.0471*** -0.0471***
(0.0151) (0.0151)
Phase 2 (SemiPri) -0.0390*** -0.0391***
(0.0123) (0.0123)
Phase 3 (Pri) -0.0429** -0.0731***
(0.0187) (0.0123)
Risky investment A -0.0412***
(0.00871)
Risky investment B -0.00119
(0.00871)
Constant 0.365*** 0.355***
(0.0224) (0.0215)
Observations 1,701 1,701
Number of groups 63 63
Log likelihood 748.52 747.86
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Random effect models
clustered at group level.
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Table 8: Tobit regressions of non-M’s bid β#i
Regressions (7) (8)
Variables Bid Bid
M’s claim m# 0.118*** 0.110***
(0.0243) (0.0223)
Investment value v#i 0.423*** 0.412***
(0.0281) (0.0254)
Dummy for v#i < 0 -81.93*** -46.12***
(31.45) (12.81)
Investment value v#i × (Dummy for v
#
i < 0) 0.531*** 0.703***
(0.174) (0.0658)
Phase 1 (Pub) × Round 2 8.051 8.570
(16.53) (15.99)
Phase 1 (Pub) × Round 3 26.22* 27.00*
(15.27) (14.58)
Phase 2 (SemiPri) 5.998 32.19**
(27.84) (13.67)
Phase 3 (Pri) 46.95*** 46.50***
(12.72) (12.31)
Risky investment A -57.71** -32.37***
(29.44) (10.86)
Risky investment B 12.88 14.58
(12.78) (10.16)
Constant -91.03*** -89.77***
(23.36) (22.18)
Observations 5,103 5,098
Number of groups 63 63
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Clustered at the
group level and the subject level. Robust errors are used due to heteroskedasticity. The dummy variable
in the third row is 1 if v#i is negative, otherwise 0. The upper limit of the tobit model is v
#
i + 166, which
is the largest bid a non-M participant is allowed to input. The lower limit is −9999. Regression 7 uses all
the observations. Regression 8 excludes 5 observations of outliers in SemiPri , which are 4 observations of
−9999 and 1 observation of −4000.
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